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Abstract 
We empirically examine consumer showrooming phenomenon in the footwear industry. Using transaction-
level data from a large online footwear retailer and offline store entry data from four major footwear retail 
chains in the U.S., we quantify the effect of offline store entry on the competing online retailer. We provide 
evidence for the presence of both showrooming and competing effects, and find that the net effect depends 
on the type of new offline stores: (1) single-brand stores (e.g., Clarks) that solely carry the manufacturer 
brand and (2) multi-brand stores (e.g., Shoe Carnival) that feature a wide selection of brands and styles. 
The results show that the showrooming effect is dominant, leading to increased online purchases, when a 
single-brand store opens; meanwhile, the competing effect is dominant, resulting in decreased online 
purchases, when a multi-brand store opens. While both types of offline store entry can stimulate demand, 
multi-brand stores are more likely to meet consumer demand with wider selection and more competitive 
pricing, compared to single-brand stores. For single-brand store entry, we observe not only a within-brand 
showrooming effect, where online purchases for the brand of the respective offline store increase, but also 
a cross-brand showrooming effect, where online purchases of other brands also increase. We further 
analyze the effect of offline store entry on average price of items purchased online and examine the 
moderating effects of location characteristics. Our work contributes to the literature on online and offline 
markets by quantifying the cross-channel effects across retailers and explaining the underlying mechanisms.  
 
Keywords: Electronic Commerce; Cross-Channel Effects; Showrooming; Natural Experiment; 
Propensity Score Matching 
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1. Introduction 
The online and offline markets are increasingly intersecting through the behaviors of many consumers who 
are savvy in both markets. Whereas the offline market is inarguably superior in providing product 
experience, the online market is often equipped with a much wider product selection and offers more 
competitive prices. Strategic consumers take advantage of both channels through the behavior of 
showrooming. It refers to the practice of examining and experiencing products in an offline store and then 
making the purchase online sometimes at a lower price (Swift 2013, Wikipedia 2016). With the penetration 
of Internet and mobile technologies in recent years, showrooming is increasingly prevalent. Columbia 
Business School’s showrooming report (Quint et al. 2013) documents that 58% of adult smartphone owners 
engage in the practice of showrooming in various product categories.  
 Showrooming is changing the traditional dynamics between online and offline markets. On the one 
hand, showrooming has become a growing concern for offline businesses. With consumers’ showrooming 
activities, the new offline store may help the competing online retailer generate more transactions, leading 
to a showrooming effect. The offline stores not only allow consumers to experience product features that 
cannot be easily or accurately assessed online, but also raise consumption awareness and stimulates 
purchase intentions (Quint et al. 2013). Major retailers such as Best Buy, WalMart, and Target have been 
fighting showrooming against online retailers like Newegg.com and Amazon.com (Wingfield 2013, YEC 
2013). On the other hand, the online retailer can lose demand to the newly opened offline store as some 
consumers find shopping at the local store more preferable (Forman et al. 2009), which creates a competing 
effect. Both effects can change consumer purchases at the online retailer when an offline store opens. To 
understand the mechanism and quantify the magnitude of showrooming, it is important to reexamine the 
competitive landscape across the online and offline markets. 
 The existing research offers mixed results for the change in online purchases in response to offline 
store entry. Forman et al. (2009) show that openings of bricks-and-mortar book stores reduce book 
purchases online. Their results identify the competing effect of offline market on the online market for 
books. However, the recent studies in multi-channel retailing offer contrasting evidence. Bell et al. (2015) 
study the offline and online channels of an eyewear retailer. They find that openings of the offline 
showrooms increase sales and reduce returns in the online channel. Kumar et al. (2014) also show that the 
store opening of a fashion retailer leads to more sales in this retailer’s online channel.  
We empirically examine the effect of offline shoe store entry on a competing, major shoe retailer 
that operates exclusively online. Our empirical setting differs significantly from the aforementioned works 
and enables us to identify both the showrooming and competing effects. Bell et al. (2015) and Kumar et al. 
(2014) both focus on a single retailer’s online and offline channels; thus, the effect of store opening on the 
online channel is retailer-centric. Their research questions do not aim at addressing how a retailer’s store 
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opening affects a competing online retailer’s sales. In our work, the Internet shoe retailer operates 
exclusively online. We study the effects of offline store openings on online sales across retailers, in the 
scope of the footwear industry. In this sense, our setting relates more to that in Forman et al. (2009), as both 
their study and ours explore the dynamics between competing retailers across online and offline channels. 
However, as explained in their work, Forman et al. (2009) focus on books for which the consumer 
involvement is low and key product features can generally be identified in either channel. Thus, the main 
factors of interest in their work are transportation cost and geographic distance. Our research complements 
Forman et al. (2009) by examining a different type of product (i.e., footwear), for which the consumer 
involvement is high (Gu et al. 2012) and the offline experience is significantly more effective than online 
experience in determining consumers’ willingness-to-purchase. In our context, showrooming can play a 
more critical role in the underlying economic mechanism.   
 To determine whether showrooming or competing effect is dominant and the key factors involved, 
we differentiate the opening stores by the breadth of brand selection. At a manufacturer-owned company 
shoe store, such as Clarks or Steve Madden, only the company brand is available. We refer to these as 
single-brand stores. A number of independent shoe retailer stores, such as Designer Shoe Warehouse (DSW) 
and Shoe Carnival, carry a wide variety of brands. We call these multi-brand stores. The online shoe retailer 
in our study is comparable to the multi-brand stores, with at least equal, if not greater, variety of shoe 
brands. Our main finding is that the single-brand store and multi-brand store openings lead to opposite 
results in the net change of online purchases. For single-brand store openings, the showrooming effect is 
dominant; that is, the number of items purchased at the online retailer increases following the single-brand 
store opening. On the other hand, the competing effect is dominant for multi-brand store openings, which 
reduces the purchases at the online retailer. The latter confirms that the competing effect identified by 
Forman et al. (2009) is generalizable even to a type of product that is drastically different than books. 
 To understand the two contrasting results identified in our study, we consider both product 
assortment and price of the retailers. Although both types of offline store entry can stimulate demand for 
shoes, the conversion to purchase may not always occur at the offline store. Compared with single-brand 
stores, multi-brand stores carry a wider variety of shoes with a larger brand selection and are often more 
price-competitive. Based on these factors, consumers are more likely to find the shoes that match their 
preferences and budget, and make a purchase in store. This substitutes demand away from the online retailer. 
With single-brand store openings, consumers are made more aware of the store brand and their purchase 
desires, but they are less likely to find the preferred product in store because of relatively limited product 
selection. Also, single-brand stores tend to position themselves as premier shops without steep discounts. 
Based on these characteristics, the demand stimulated by single-brand stores may not be fully captured at 
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the stores and, in turn, spills over to the online retailer where better matched products may be purchased 
eventually.   
 We further explore the mechanisms for showrooming at the brand level. We observe both within-
brand and cross-brand showrooming; that is, a specific shoe brand store entry increases online purchases 
of the same brand as that at the offline store and those of the other brands. Specifically, we analyze Clarks 
and Steve Madden store openings and find an increase in purchases of Clarks or Steve Madden shoes at the 
online retailer. This evidence for within-brand showrooming provides valuable insights for a brand 
manufacturer in understanding the role of its online and offline retail partners in consumer purchases, and 
enables the brand manufacturer to more accurately evaluate the contributions of different retail partners to 
brand sales and to more effectively manage their relationships for market growth. Moreover, the online 
purchases for other brands rose overall. Thus, when offline Clarks or Steve Madden store openings drive 
consumers to the online retailer, the availability of other brands and footwear types can result in final 
purchases that are neither Clarks nor Steve Madden items—we call this cross-brand showrooming. 
Although cross-brand showrooming is less pronounced than within-brand showrooming, it illustrates the 
market interactions between brands across different channels, and reveals the more nuanced relationship 
among brand manufacturers than pure competition.  
 We also examine other important factors at the online retailer, including revenue, the average price 
of purchased products, time-varying effects of both showrooming and competing, and moderating effects 
of relevant locational characteristics. The shifts in the online retailer’s revenues due to offline store entry 
are economically significant for both types of store entry. Consistent with the results for the number of 
items sold, single-brand store openings raise the online retailer’s revenues, whereas multi-brand store 
openings have the opposite outcome. Based on the online retailer’s average weekly revenue, $556 per zip 
code area, single-brand store openings increase the weekly online revenues by 14% ($78) per zip code; 
multi-brand store openings reduce the weekly online revenues, roughly by 16% ($93) per zip code. Thus, 
for the period of our analysis, the total change in the online retailer’s revenues amounts to $36 million. 
Clearly, it is economically important to understand cross-retailer competition and consider these 
interactions in optimizing business strategies. The changes in average purchase price of online products 
provide coherent evidence that further substantiates the main findings on showrooming and competing 
effects from the two types of store entry.  
 The remaining of the paper is organized as the following. We discuss the research background in 
light of the related studies in Section 2. Section 3 describes the data sets in this study. In Section 4, we 
explain the empirical model. Section 5 presents the findings and the related discussions. Finally, Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
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2. Literature Review  
In this section, we highlight the studies in the literature that are most relevant to our work. Our work 
considers competition between the online and offline markets as well as the benefit the offline market may 
create for the online market. Two streams of literature, competition and complementarity between the 
online and offline markets, are closely related to our research.  
2.1 Competition between Online and Offline markets 
Competition between the two markets is well documented in prior studies from the perspectives of the 
relative prices of online and offline retailers, offline transportation cost, and the breadth of product line. 
First, online prices are generally lower than offline prices (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000), which is one of 
the major reasons for online purchases. Goolsbee (2000) shows that people living in locations with high 
sales taxes are significantly more likely to buy online to avoid sales tax. Similarly, Ellison and Ellison (2009) 
find that applying sales taxes to online purchases could reduce online sales. In Goolsbee (2001), he further 
examines cross-channel competition by estimating consumers’ price sensitivity in their channel choice of 
computer purchases. He finds that the sensitivity of experienced and desktop buyers is much greater than 
inexperienced and laptop buyers. Forman et al. (2009) show that the relative price online has a significant 
positive effect on online book sales but offline store entry decreases consumers’ sensitivity to online price 
discounts. Nelson et al. (2012) show that more price-sensitive travelers tend to switch to online booking, 
leading to higher price elasticity online compared to offline.  
 Second, consumers’ offline transportation costs affect their channel choices and thus influence the 
competition between the online and offline markets. The costs may be the monetary cost of travel, 
inconvenience cost, and/or the opportunity cost of time (Forman et al. 2009). From this perspective, Forman 
et al. (2009) find that local store openings lead to lower online sales and the consumers’ distance from the 
new local stores plays an important role in determining the effect. Brynjolfsson et al. (2009) show that 
better access to offline stores reduces online demand for apparel. The distance to the offline stores also 
inversely affects consumers’ price sensitivities (Chu et al. 2010).   
 Third, the competition between the online and offline markets may depend on product assortment. 
Brynjolfsson et al. (2009) examine cross-channel competition based on product selection and show that 
online retailers face intense competition from offline retailers for mainstream products but not for niche 
products. Similarly, Choi and Bell (2011) also find that consumers whose preferences are dissimilar to the 
majority are more likely to shop online and that niche brands, compared with popular brands, show greater 
offline-to-online sales substitution. However, Forman et al. (2009) find no consistent evidence that the 
breadth of the product line at the offline book store affects online purchases. Zentner et al. (2013) examine 
the impacts of local store closure on consumers’ choices online and find that when consumers move from 
offline to online channels, they are more likely to choose niche products relative to popular ones. Moreover, 
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Quan and Williams (2014) show that the high product variety online may not effectively attract consumers, 
if their tastes vary geographically and offline stores cater to the local demand. They suggest that offline 
retailers might increase their revenue by localizing product assortments.  
2.2 Complementarity between Online and Offline markets 
The synergy between the online and offline channels in increasing brand recognition and consumer 
satisfaction for a multichannel retailer has long been established. Kwon and Lennon (2009) show that 
consumers’ online and offline brand attitudes were influenced not only by brand beliefs from the respective 
channel but also by the beliefs from the other channel. Chyi and Lasorsa (2002) provide evidence for the 
complementary relation between online and print newspapers that the print format was preferred even 
among Internet users when compared with the online edition.  Levin et al. (2003) find that alliances between 
online and offline brands can capitalize on the complementarity of favorable online and offline features and 
affect consumers’ perception towards both brands.  
 A recent and growing literature is exploring the complementarity between online and offline 
channels in capturing consumer demand, that is, how the respective channel may increase consumer 
purchases in the other channel. On the one hand, Gallino and Moreno (2014) analyze the impact of sharing 
store inventory information online through “buy-online, pick-up-in-store” and find an increase in store sales 
and traffic. On the other hand, Avery et al. (2012), Bell et al. (2015), and Kumar et al. (2014) consistently 
identify a positive effect on a company’s online business, when the company introduces stores offline. The 
findings in Avery et al. (2012) do not suggest competition between the two channels; in fact, the online 
channel benefits from the new offline stores in the long run. Bell et al. (2015) study the openings of 
inventory display channel for an online eyewear retailer and find an increased demand for all channels after 
the openings. Kumar et al. (2014) further extend this line of work by studying the consumers’ product 
returns in addition to their purchase behavior. They find that offline store entries lead to higher store 
purchases and returns and more diverse online purchases. They also show that being able to evaluate and 
return products in stores results in higher average product price in online purchases.   
 The positive effect of the offline market on the online demand is attributed to consumer 
showrooming in general. Consumers’ uncertainty towards online products is one of the key drivers for 
showrooming. Consumers can browse products at offline stories to resolve uncertainties regarding product 
features, and then purchase the products online. Balakrishnan et al. (2014) analytically model online and 
offline firms’ and consumers’ decisions and show that consumers do exhibit showrooming behaviors in 
equilibrium. Liu (2013) analyzes the pricing matching strategy for two quality-differentiated offline firms, 
in response to showrooming. The author shows that the degree of showrooming practice is important in 
determining the high- and low-quality firms’ equilibrium strategies. Mehra et al. (2014) evaluate three anti-
showrooming strategies that offline stores employ. They find that, depending on the product’s digital 
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attributes and valuation, the offline stores may benefit by increasing the difficulty of price comparison or 
by imposing a cost on showrooming for consumers. 
3. Research Context and Data 
3.1 Empirical Setting 
We utilize data from a natural experimental setting to assess the impact of offline store entries on a 
competing online retailer. We collected data on consumer purchases at a large U.S. online retailer that sells 
primarily footwear. This online retailer carries more than 40,000 unique footwear items. In 2013, it 
generated over $2 billion in revenue.1 During our study period, the online retailer does not have any physical 
stores or showrooms. With the exclusive online presence, the online retailer itself does not have any other 
channel that could affect its online channel. This is especially suitable for our focus of cross-retailer 
showrooming effect, which the online retailer experiences as a result of the entry of its offline competitors.  
 The data on the online retailer contains the purchase transactions of footwear products from January 
30 to August 14, 2013. Each record contains the purchase date and time, zip code location of the customer, 
and information on the purchased product including ID, name, brand, original price, and purchase price. 
Consumer identity is anonymous, so we aggregate the transaction-level data by zip code. Henceforth, we 
use “location” to refer to a zip code area. To ensure a sufficient number of observed purchases in each 
period, we aggregate the transactions by week. As a result, each observation in our data is a particular 
location-week. Our complete data of online transactions spans 28 weeks and contains 23,146 U.S. zip codes 
that had at least one transaction during the 28 weeks. 
 To examine the cross-retailer effects, we also need data on the online retailer’s offline competitors. 
From a proprietary database, we acquired data on offline store entries in the U.S. by footwear companies. 
The database provides the address and the general timeframe, but not the exact date, for offline store entries. 
Through corporate press releases, social media channels, and local newspaper articles, we cross-referenced 
and accurately identified the opening dates for all the new stores of Clarks, Steve Madden, Designer Shoe 
Warehouse (DSW), and Shoe Carnival (Table 1). These stores and the shoe brands they carry are well 
recognized by consumers. Moreover, Clarks and Steve Madden products were available and purchased at 
the online retailer during our sample period; most of the brands sold at DSW and Shoe Carnival are also 
available at the online retailer. Thus, the entries of these stores are very likely to have an impact on the 
online retailer. As mentioned in the introduction section, we further categorize these stores into two types: 
single-brand store and multi-brand store.  
Table 1. Offline Store Entries 
                                                     
1 All monetary amounts are in U.S. dollars. 
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Store Type Store Name Number of Entries 
Single-brand Store 
Clarks 13 
Steve Madden 2 
Multi-brand Store 
DSW 13 
Shoe Carnival 29 
  
 The online retailer competes with the two types of offline stores in different ways (Table 2). The 
online retailer offers much wider assortment compared to single-brand stores (i.e., Clarks and Steve 
Madden). At the online retailer, consumers are more likely to find the shoes of their preferences in terms 
of size, color, style, and brand. In this respect, the multi-brand stores (i.e., DSW and Shoe Carnival) are 
more similar to the online retailer. In particular, both DSW and Shoe Carnival carry a wide range of popular 
brands as well as different styles. Although the online retailer may still carry more niche brands and styles, 
our focus is on the large overlap in inventory between the online retailer and the multi-brand stores. 
Table 2. Comparison between Retailers 
Competing Factors Online Retailer 
Offline Retailers 
Single-brand Stores Multi-brand Stores 
Wide Assortment Yes No Yes 
Price Discount Minimal to none Minimal to none Yes 
 
  Another important difference between the two types of offline stores is their pricing. Whereas 
single-brand stores often emphasize brand concept, customer experience, and latest trends, multi-brand 
stores aim to offer higher value for money, as described in the mission statements of both DSW and Shoe 
Carnival.2 In contrast, the online retailer does not compete on price. In fact, most of its products are not 
discounted. During our data period, items purchased at a discounted price only account for 30% of total 
purchases, and the average discount for all items purchased is 6.6%. Instead, the online retailer is well 
recognized for its superior customer service such as fast and reliable shipping, generous return policies, and 
24/7 support hotline. As consumers enjoy free standard shipping and return, online shopping would not 
incur additional costs except for some consumption delay. 
                                                     
2 DSW Inc. publishes the following description of its business on the website: “At the core of DSW Inc. is DSW Designer Shoe 
Warehouse, the destination for fabulous brands at a great value every single day. With thousands of shoes for women and men in 
over 400 stores nationwide, DSW is all about the thrill of finding the perfect shoe at the perfect price.” 
(http://www.dswinc.com/about_dsw.jsp) Shoe Carnival brands itself as “one of the nation’s largest family footwear retailers, 
offering a broad assortment of moderately priced dress, casual and athletic footwear for men, women and children with emphasis 
on national and regional name brands.” Its Wikipedia page explains that “the Shoe Carnival Concept is creating an urgency to buy 
through limited time promotions and the microphone. The mic person announces ‘specials’ over the microphone. These specials 
include discount, product information, and fun specials which encourage customers to make a purchase.” 
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 We collected additional datasets that are useful for the empirical analysis. From the 2010 U.S. 
Census Bureau data, we obtained zip code demographic information, including population, households, 
economic standing, gender, racial, and age components. This allows us to assess comparability of locations. 
It also enables us to examine different opening effects across different strata along these demographics. In 
addition, we used the zip code longitude and latitude information to compute the geographic distances 
between zip codes, which can moderate the effect of store entry. Lastly, as online shopping is facilitated by 
Internet access, we also utilize data on Internet access services for each location, provided by Federal 
Communications Commission Form 477 dated December 31, 2012. 
3.2 Detailed Data Description 
During our 28-week sample period, the online retailer sold a total of 4.54 million footwear items3 from 
about 650 brands. Based on purchase prices, the computed total revenue is $360 million, and the average 
weekly revenue per location is $556. In terms of brand popularity during this period, Clarks ranked No. 4 
with 129,114 items sold, and Steve Madden ranked No. 32 with 34,407 items sold. This suggests that we 
are able to observe the choices of a large number of Clarks and Steve Madden customers. Table 3 presents 
the weekly summary statistics for all locations. 
Table 3. Summary Statistics by Location-Week 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of Purchased Items 648088 7.009 16.919 0 1193 
        Discounted Items 648088 2.085 5.269 0 215 
        Regular-price Items 648088 4.924 12.289 0 1020 
        Clarks Items 648088 0.186 0.668 0 26 
        Steve Madden Items 648088 0.058 0.326 0 28 
        Other Brand Items 648088 6.765 16.404 0 1157 
Revenue 648088 555.575 1387.400 0 90957.44 
        Revenue from Discounted Items 648088 154.169 411.905 0 19498.11 
        Revenue from Regular-price Items 648088 401.406 1029.369 0 79541.35 
Average Discount Rate 369542 0.066 0.069 0 0.7 
Average Price per Purchased Item 369542 77.896 28.524 6.99 1172.5 
Average Original Price per Clarks Item 352 110.559 36.617 33.026 300 
Average Price per Clarks Item 352 93.303 27.334 31.788 203.279 
Average Original Price per Steve Madden Item 345 108.217 34.743 26 199.95 
Average Price per Steve Madden Item 345 91.984 29.143 23.99 198.78 
 
                                                     
3 Each footwear item refers to a pair of shoes. 
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 There were a total of 57 store entries by Clarks, Steve Madden, DSW, and Shoe Carnival during 
our period of analysis. Figure 1 shows a map of U.S. indicating the locations of the store entries. It is evident 
that the entries did not occur randomly. The geographic distribution of store entries is highly concentrated 
on the east side, and 40% of them took place in Arizona, Michigan, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Iowa. Our 
empirical approach aims to address any differences between the locations within the influence areas of the 
store entries and those beyond the influence areas. Also note that, among the store entries, we observe no 
apparent locational distinction between entries of single-brand stores and multi-brand stores. Figure 2 
shows the timing of the store entries. Most of the 57 store entries occurred in week 6-16. This allows for 
reasonable lengths of study periods both before and after store entries.  
 
Figure 1. Locations of Offline Store Entries  
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Figure 2. Timing of Offline Store Entries 
  
 Table 4 provides the distribution of locations with store entries in our sample. For each store entry, 
we define its influence area to include the locations within a 30-mile radius. In robustness checks, we 
change this influence area to be within a 15-mile radius (see Section 5.7). Among the 23,146 locations in 
our panel, 3,977 of which are in the influence area of store entries at some point during the 28 weeks. 
Among the 3,977 locations, 3218 locations (81%) were affected by only one store entry during the 28 weeks. 
The 15 single-brand store entries and 42 multi-brand store entries affected 2,007 and 2,471 locations, 
respectively. Thus, the two types of store entries are fairly balanced in their affected locations (8.7% versus 
10.7%). We can capture the effect from each by distinguishing between the two types of entries in the 
model. 
Table 4. Distribution of Locations Affected by Offline Store Entries 
 
 
Number of 
Locations 
Percentage of  
Locations 
Not affected  19169 82.8% 
Affected by  3977 17.2% 
 1 entry 3218 13.9% 
 2 entries 378 1.6% 
 More than 2 entries 381 1.6% 
 Single-brand store entries 2007 8.7% 
 Multi-brand store entries 2471 10.7% 
 Both types of entries 501 2.2% 
 Clarks entries 1854 8.0% 
 Steve Madden entries 153 0.7% 
 DSW entries 993 4.3% 
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 Shoe Carnival entries 1644 7.1% 
Total 23146 100% 
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
Our goal is to examine showrooming and competing effects using offline store entries and the online 
transaction data. If we simply analyze the locations affected by store entries and compare the online 
transactions in the periods before and after store entry, the difference that we observe may include other 
factors that are irrelevant to store entries. For example, certain severe weather changes or a sudden rise in 
popularity of certain footwear items can cause an upward trend in online sales. We utilize a difference-in-
differences (DID) approach to deal with this challenge. The DID approach involves treatment and control 
groups, which would include the locations that are affected and not affected by store entries, respectively. 
We can measure the impact of store entry by comparing its effect in the treatment group with that in the 
control group. The factors that are common to both groups would then be “differenced out” (Avery et al. 
2012).  
 For DID approach to be effective, the treatment and control groups would need to follow parallel 
time trends. This is not necessarily a reasonable assumption because the locations that are near store entries 
(treatment) can be fundamentally different from the remaining locations (non-treatment), which are far from 
and not affected by store entries. In other words, the store openings are endogenous in location 
characteristics. A company may be more inclined to open a branch in a location where people have greater 
purchase power, for instance. To address this issue, we utilize a propensity score matching (PSM) approach 
to identify the non-treatment locations that are indeed comparable to the treatment locations. Only these 
matched non-treatment locations are then included in the control group in the DID estimation.   
4.1 Propensity Score Matching 
We provide a detailed comparison of the treatment and non-treatment locations in terms of demographics 
and the characteristics of offline footwear stores in Table 5. The statistics confirm that store entries are 
unlikely to be random (Columns (1)-(3)). The treatment locations are significantly more populated and 
economically advanced, with younger and richer population, more Internet usage coverage, and more local 
businesses, especially shoe businesses. All these confounding factors can potentially influence online 
purchases and their dynamics over time. Thus, one would be concerned that store entries themselves may 
not affect online purchases made in the area and that the underlying correlated factors may be driving both 
store entries and changes in online purchases that we observe. 
 
Table 5. Comparison of Location Characteristics 
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All Samples Matched Samples 
Treatment 
Mean 
(1) 
Non-treatment 
Mean 
(2) 
Difference 
(3) 
Treatment 
Mean 
(4) 
Matched/Control 
Mean 
(5) 
Difference 
(6) 
Population 21070 10822 10248*** 21175 21528 -352.9 
Households 7928 4105 3823*** 7926 8128 -201.9 
AvgIncomePerHH 65166 51036 14130*** 65415 64986 428.7 
AvgHouseValue 274151 167282 106868*** 269128 269021 106.7 
PersonsPerHH 2.552 2.51 0.04*** 2.60 2.59 -0.012 
WhiteRatio 0.75 0.86 -0.11*** 0.76 0.75 0.008 
BlackRatio 0.15 0.08 0.06*** 0.14 0.14 0.002 
FemaleRatio 0.51 0.50 0.01*** 0.51 0.51 0.001 
MedianAge 38.05 40.76 -2.71*** 38.61 38.55 0.060 
MaleMediaAge 36.99 39.86 -2.87*** 37.55 37.59 -0.040 
FemaleMediaAge 38.95 41.63 -2.67*** 39.55 39.44 0.109 
AllBusiness 522.3 249.9 272.4*** 521.3 519.8 1.45 
InternetUse 4.23 3.74 0.48*** 4.21 4.19 0.021 
ShoeBusiness 608.0 121.3 486.7*** 518.5 514.5 4.01 
SmallShoeBusiness 474.8 92.8 382.0*** 401.7 402.2 -0.515 
MediumShoeBusiness 114.1 23.5 90.61*** 99.43 96.07 3.37 
MinDistance 4.51 10.84 -6.33*** 4.71 4.73 -0.020 
HadClarks 0.88 0.35 0.53*** 0.87 0.88 -0.004 
HadSteveMadden 0.65 0.15 0.50*** 0.63 0.63 -0.001 
HadDSW 0.87 0.40 0.47*** 0.86 0.87 -0.006 
HadShoeCarnival 0.49 0.37 0.13*** 0.52 0.52 -0.007 
Propensity score 0.422 0.124 0.298*** 0.402 0.402 0.000 
Sample size 3977 19169  3764 3764  
Some treated locations were dropped after matching because we could not find well matched non-treated locations 
based on propensity scores. Therefore, treatment means differ slightly between all sample and matched sample. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
  
 We combine PSM with DID approach to address the endogeneity issue of store entry. PSM 
approach was first introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and has been widely applied to address 
endogeneity and to reduce the potential biases arising when covariates are correlated with the treatment 
indicator (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009).  The propensity score is calculated as the probability of an 
individual observational unit receiving treatment conditional on its covariates. The matching is then 
performed to identify, for each of the treatment unit, the non-treatment units with similar propensity scores. 
The average effect of the treatment is then estimated by averaging within-match differences in the outcome 
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variable between the treated and the untreated unites. The major advantage of PSM for estimation lies in 
its dimension reduction feature (Blundell and Costa-Dias 2000). 
 We conducted PSM in the following steps. First, we calculated the propensity score for each sample 
location conditional on all the characteristics listed in Table 5 using a logit model. The second step is to 
match one by one based on propensity score, where we applied the nearest neighbor with replacement 
matching algorithm. That is, for each treatment location, we chose a non-treatment location such that the 
gap between their propensity scores is the smallest. We dropped matched pairs for which the distance of 
scores exceeded two standard deviations of the observed distribution of propensity score differences. 
Matching is iterated until the treatment and the matched locations show no significant differences in all 
characteristics. This process yielded matched pairs that are equally likely to experience store entries based 
on observed location characteristics, contrasting them on the sole dimension of their actual store entry 
experience. 
 Columns (4)-(6) of Table 5 presents the comparison of the treatment and matched locations. It 
shows that the matched group does well resemble the treatment group in all the observed characteristics. 
We also check whether the two groups demonstrate similar time trends in online purchases by plotting the 
weekly average number of items purchased and the week-to-week percentage change per location over time 
(Figure 3). In both graphs, the time trends in the treatment and matched locations are nearly identical, 
suggesting that the matched locations are appropriate controls. We also observe that the treatment locations 
tend to have slightly more purchased items than the matched locations (Figure 3a). Although difference-in-
differences model can account for such systematic difference in the dependent variable, as a robustness 
check, we use only the treatment locations for estimation as they tend to be more homogeneous (see the 
Section 5.7). Because the store entries occurred at different time points, we can use the different treatment 
time windows for identification of the treatment effect. 
(a) 
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(b) 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of Online Purchases in Treatment and Matched Locations 
 
4.2 Difference-in-Differences Model 
After PSM, we implement a DID approach to determine whether the offline store entries have any impact 
on the online retailer. Our matched sample for empirical analyses consists of (1) the treatment locations 
that are within the influence area of the store entries and (2) the control locations that are out of the influence 
area and matched to the treatment locations. Using a DID approach, we can compute the difference in online 
purchases before and after store entries in the treatment locations and in their respective control locations. 
The effect of store entry is quantified by the difference between these differences of the treatment and 
control groups.  Our basic model is  
  𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑤𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡.      (1) 
  
In equation (1), the dependent variable 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the outcome of interest, i.e., the number of purchased 
items (𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑡 ), the total revenue generated (𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 ), or the average price for purchased items 
(𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡), for location 𝑖 in week 𝑡. 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the treatment indicator that equals 1 if location 𝑖 is 
treated and experienced store entry in week 𝑡 or earlier, and 0 otherwise. This specification accounts for the 
fact that the store openings are staggered over time across treatment locations. Accordingly, the 
composition of both the treatment and matched locations changes over time as more locations are 
progressively treated with more store openings. The unobservables are decomposed into three components: 
𝜇𝑖 is a location-specific effect that allows for time-invariant location heterogeneity; 𝑤𝑡 is week-specific 
effects that controls for seasonal effects that are constant across locations; and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is a temporary location 
effect.  
 To differentiate the two types of store entries, we extend equation (1) by replacing 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 
with two treatment indicators 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡  and 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡  for the entries of single-
brand and multi-brand stores respectively. The extended model is  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑤𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 .     (2) 
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As we use panel data on locations for multiple periods before and after the treatment, the estimation 
of equation (1) and (2) are possibly subject to a serial correlation problem. In that case, the default standard 
errors can overstate estimator precision. Clustering standard errors by location can address this issue by 
allowing for both heteroskedesticity and within-cluster correlation in the error terms (Bertrand et al. 2004). 
As such, we report cluster-robust standard errors for coefficients in all results.    
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Offline Store Entries and Online Purchases 
To see whether the offline store entries generate any impact on the number of items purchased at the online 
retailer, we present DID estimates of specifications (1) and (2) in Table 6. Columns (1) and (2) present the 
baseline results using 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑡 (the number of items purchased in location 𝑖 in week 𝑡) as the dependent 
variable. According to column (1), when the entries of single-brand stores and multi-brand stores are not 
differentiated, we find no significant effects of offline store entries on online purchases. However, by 
classifying the stores into single-brand and multi-brand stores in the regression model, we find that each 
type of store entry has a statistically significant effect on online purchases, and the two coefficients have 
opposite signs (column (2)). The insignificance of the coefficient in column (1) is likely because the positive 
impact of single-brand store entries offsets the negative impact of multi-brand store entries.   
 According to the results, showrooming effect is the dominant effect for single-brand store entry, 
leading to a positive net effect on 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑡, whereas competing effect is dominant for multi-brand store 
entry, which produces an overall negative effect. This means that when a single-brand store opens, 
consumers in the vicinity of the new store tend to purchase more from the online retailer, whereas after a 
multi-brand store opens, nearby consumers generally purchase fewer items online. On average, the change 
in online purchases per location per week is about 26% for single-brand store entry and -19% for multi-
brand store entry. 
 
Table 6. Store Entry Effects on the Online Retailer 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Items Items Revenue Average Price 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡  0.194    
 (0.128)    
𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡  1.881*** 78.5*** -1.024** 
  (0.176) (13.3) (0.312) 
𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡   -1.313*** -93.0*** 0.743* 
  (0.119) (10.7) (0.330) 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
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Location fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 210,784 210,784 210,784 166,065 
R-squared 0.198 0.200 0.188 0.029 
Standard errors are clustered by location and presented in parentheses. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 
 The diverging results for the two types of stores can be driven by product assortment. Both types 
of store openings can stimulate demand for shoes. Particularly, single-brand stores, such as Clarks and 
Steve Madden, tend to more aggressively market their brand concepts to consumers in the offline channel. 
They would often invest more in store décor, customer service, and advertisements, all of which can 
substantially raise brand awareness and stimulate demand for footwear in general. However, single-brand 
stores sell only the shoes of their own brand as manufacturer-owned shoe retailers, which naturally limits 
product assortment compared to multi-brand stores such as DSW and Shoe Carnival. As a result, even if 
consumers have increased purchase desire, they are less likely to find their most preferred products at a 
single-brand store due to the relatively limited product assortment in terms of brand and style. Thus, the 
increased demand that is stimulated but not captured by single-brand stores can spill over to the online 
retailer, introducing a strong showrooming effect.   
 Compared to single-brand stores, multi-brand stores have much wider assortment including most 
of the popular brands and varied footwear types (e.g., dress, casual, and athletic). They are more likely to 
have a product to match the needs of each customer. This creates a more direct rivalry between multi-brand 
stores and the online retailer, which also offers broad assortment of footwear products. Moreover, the multi-
brand stores observed in our data offer many products at discounted prices and are thus more price-
competitive compared to single-brand stores. 4  As a result, both wide product assortment and price 
competitiveness allow multi-brand stores to take away a substantial portion of the demand for the online 
retailer. A much stronger competing effect is then generated and outweighs the showrooming effect.  
 The effect of store entries on the online retailer’s revenue is also strong, as shown in Column (3) 
with 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 as the dependent variable. Qualitatively, the insight for online revenues in response to local 
store openings is consistent with that of the number of items sold. That is, single-brand openings raise the 
online retailer’s revenues, whereas multi-brand openings have the opposite effect. Quantitatively, the shifts 
in the online retailer’s revenues due to local store openings are economically significant for both types of 
openings. A single-brand store entry increases the per-location-per-week revenue by $78.5 (14.1%) for the 
online retailer, and a multi-brand store entry leads to a revenue loss of $93 (16.7%) per location per week. 
Given that the online retailer’s average weekly revenue per zip code is $556, the total change in the online 
                                                     
4 Wang et al. (2009) show with both analytical modeling and anecdotal market data that company store (single-brand store) charges 
more than the independent retailer (multi-brand store) does when they compete in the same market. 
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retailer’s revenues for the period of our analysis amounts to $36 million. Such scale of store opening effects 
highlights the importance of understanding cross-channel competition at the industry level and considering 
these interactions in devising business strategies. 
5.2 Within-Brand and Cross-Brand Showrooming Effects 
In this section, we examine the mechanism of showrooming effect at the brand level, within-brand 
showrooming and cross-brand showrooming. Within-brand showrooming is largely driven by the 
showrooming behavior in a narrow sense.  In this case, consumers evaluate products at offline stores to 
determine their purchasing intentions and then purchase these products online. Especially for products like 
footwear, offline stores allow consumers to more effectively assess the quality, fit, and style of a specific 
product, thus minimizing the uncertainty regarding the product and the brand. It is natural for consumers to 
make an online purchase of the same product or a similar product under the same brand. This results in 
within-brand showrooming, such that the product or brand purchased online does not deviate from the 
product or brand evaluated offline.  
A broader interpretation of showrooming can lead to cross-brand showrooming. The largest 
consumer segment that uses mobile phone to search online when shopping offline is the “experience seekers” 
who do not plan showrooming for any specific products in advance (Quint et al. 2013). These consumers 
tend to have lower affinity towards the brand of the offline store they visit. When this type of consumers 
makes online purchases after their offline experience, they are likely to choose online products that best 
meet their needs, even if the products are not those examined offline. In fact, according to Parago’s 
showrooming study (2013), showrooming shoppers often opt for a similar item that is not an exact match 
to that examined offline. Thus, in the broader sense of showrooming, the products consumers purchase 
online may very well differ from what they have examined offline. Given that single-brand stores offer a 
single shoe brand option and limited choices in terms of price range and style, showrooming consumers’ 
final online purchase may be of a different brand than that of the products examined in the offline store, 
thus, cross-brand showrooming occurs.   
 To identify either within-brand or cross-brand showrooming effect, it is important to link 
consumers’ online purchases to their offline experiences. The results from the previous section (Table 6) 
show the impacts of offline store entry on the overall online purchases. Our analysis here aims to link the 
footwear brands at the single-brand stores that opened during our data period to the specific brands 
purchased at the online retailer. In our research context, the single-brand stores (i.e., Clarks and Steve 
Madden) only sell products of their own brand. Thus, focusing on the treatment locations with single-brand 
store entry, we can evaluate the within-brand showrooming effect by examining the change in online 
purchases of Clarks or Steve Madden shoes, as a result of Clarks or Steve Madden store entry, respectively. 
Similarly, to study cross-brand showrooming, we can examine the change in online purchases of non-Clarks 
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products at the locations with Clarks store entry or non-Steve Madden products at the locations with Steve 
Madden store entry. In sum, we can identify the within-brand and cross-brand showrooming effects by 
studying how single-brand store entry affects online purchases of the same brand as the brand at the store 
versus the other brands.  
 We estimate the entry effect of the single-brand stores (i.e., Clarks or Steve Madden) on the number 
of items purchased for the same brand (Column (1) in Table 7) and for the other brands (Column (2) in 
Table 7) at the online retailer, using observations for the locations with single-brand store entry. The 
coefficients of 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 are positive and statistically significant in both estimations. That is, 
the single-brand store entries increase both the number of items purchased for the same brand and that of 
the other brands, supporting both within-brand and cross-brand showrooming effects. Quantitatively, 
single-brand store entries raise the online purchase of the same-brand items by 78% (within-brand 
showrooming effect) and that of the other-brand items by 55% (cross-brand showrooming effect) on 
average. It is evident that the within-brand showrooming effect is more pronounced than the cross-brand 
showrooming effect. 
 
Table 7. Store Entry Effects on Same- and Other-Brand Items 
 
(1) (2) 
Within-brand showrooming 
(Same-brand items) 
Cross-brand showrooming 
(Other-brand items) 
𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 0.145 (0.018)*** 3.748 (0.290)*** 
Time fixed effects YES YES 
Location fixed effects YES YES 
Observations 56,196 56,196 
R-squared 0.038 0.059 
Multi-brand stores sell shoes of a wide range of brands including Clarks and Steve Madden; thus, 
multi-brand store entry may both directly and indirectly affect the online purchases of Clarks and 
Steve Madden, and other brands. 
We measure the same-brand items according to the shoe brand of the newly opened single-brand 
store. When Clarks (Steve Madden) opens, it is calculated as the number of Clarks (Steve Madden) 
items purchased at the online retailer. 
Standard errors are clustered by location and presented in parentheses. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 
5.3 Competing Effect 
A key premise for competing effect is that new offline stores compete with the online retailer by reducing 
the transportation cost for nearby consumers, i.e., the cost to travel to an offline store. On average, an offline 
store entry is likely to reduce transportation cost more substantially for consumers located further from the 
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other offline stores that existed prior to the store entry. Thus, we should observe the strength of competing 
effect to increase with consumers’ distance to pre-existing offline stores. We use consumers’ proximity to 
pre-existing offline stores instead of the distance between the consumer’s location and the new store 
because the former only plays a role in the competing effect, not in showrooming effect, while the latter 
impacts both competing and showrooming effects. When consumers are located far from pre-existing stores, 
they may resort to making purchases online even when they in fact prefer purchasing offline if not for the 
high transportation costs. Therefore, a new offline store that reduces these consumers’ transportation cost 
is more likely to compete demand away from the online retailer, rather than generating more demand for 
the online retailer. To examine this mechanism for competing effect, we perform additional analysis to 
examine how the proximity to pre-existing stores moderates the effect of store entry. 
 We estimate the entry effect on the number of items purchased online in the regression model with 
the interactions between the store entry indicators and the proximity to pre-existing stores prior to the store 
entry (Table 8). The variable 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 is the minimum distance consumers in location 𝑖 must travel 
to the nearest footwear store,5 and is used as a proxy for proximity to pre-existing stores. Consistent with 
our premise, the results in Column (1) in Table 8 show that locations closer to (further from) pre-existing 
stores show weaker (stronger) competing effect. The coefficients of both interaction terms are statistically 
significant and negative (Column (2) in Table 8). That is, after multi-brand store entry, the decrease in the 
online purchases from locations further away from pre-existing stores is more pronounced than those closer 
to the pre-existing stores. Consistently, after a single-brand store enters, the online purchases from locations 
further away from pre-existing stores increase to a lesser extent.  
Table 8. Store Entry Effects and the Proximity to Pre-Existing Offline Stores 
Dependent variable: 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑡 (1) (2) 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡  0.820 (0.169)***  
𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡  2.209 (0.229)*** 
𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡   -1.019 (0.160)*** 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 -0.142 (0.014)***  
𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖   -0.117 (0.0239)*** 
𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 
 
 
 -0.059 (0.0124)*** 
Time fixed effects YES YES 
Location fixed effects YES YES 
Observations 210,784 210,784 
R-squared 0.199 0.200 
Standard errors are clustered by location and presented in parentheses. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 
                                                     
5 As we only observe the footwear stores within the 30-mile radius for each location, 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 is capped at 30 miles for 
locations without any footwear store within the 30 miles. 
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5.4 Impacts of Showrooming and Competing effects on Average Purchase Price  
The offline store entry may also impact the price range of products purchased online, as both showrooming 
and competing effects may change consumer preferences in addition to overall demand. For example, as 
lower price online is the major reason for consumer showrooming, it may increase purchases of low-price 
items relative to those of high-price items. To understand the role of price, we examine the changes in the 
prices of purchased items at the online retailer after offline store entry. We use 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡, the average 
price of purchased items in each location-week, as the dependent variable. DID estimation can rule out the 
alternative explanation that changes in the prices of purchased items were driven by the online retailer’s 
dynamic pricing, given that the online retailer did not price differently across locations.  
Column (4) in Table 6 shows that after multi-brand store entry, the average price of online 
purchases increases slightly.6 This is intuitive because the multi-brand stores in our data are primarily 
discount retailers, but the online retailer is not. Given that multi-brand store entry reduces online purchases 
with the dominant competing effect, the increased average price suggests that the newly opened multi-brand 
stores mainly compete with the online retailer for low-price items. As the online retailer retains more 
demand for high-price items, the average price for the purchased items increases.  
 On the contrary, the average price of online purchases is lower after single-brand store entry when 
the showrooming effect dominates. This finding is consistent with both within-brand and cross-brand 
showrooming. Within-brand showrooming is largely motivated by lower online price than offline. Instead 
of purchasing the product offline immediately, consumers who can afford consumption delay would 
purchase the same product online for a lower price. We analyze the pricing at the online retailer for Clarks 
and Steve Madden products in particular, and find that it offers more discounts for items with lower original 
prices than those with higher original price. Specifically, for Clarks, the discount rate is around 15% for 
items with below-the-median original prices and around 12% for those with above-the-median original 
prices. Thus, for the common brand carried by both the single-brand stores and the online retailer, the online 
retailer is more price-competitive for low-price items than for high-price items. Therefore, within-brand 
showrooming leads to more purchases of low-price same-brand items. For cross-brand showrooming, 
consumers’ final online purchase is a different product from the one examined at the offline store. High 
uncertainty remains with the online purchase; thus, it is more likely for consumers to reduce consumption 
risk with a low-price product. Therefore, cross-brand showrooming also reduces the average price for the 
online purchases. 
5.5 Time-Varying Showrooming and Competing effects  
                                                     
6 Although the changes in the average price are statistically significant, the magnitudes of these changes are smaller compared to 
those in the number of items sold and revenue. The percentage changes in the average price for both types of store entries are only 
about 1%; thus, store entry affects the online retailer mainly through demand. 
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Figure 4 plots the estimates of the time-varying effects of store entry on the total of items purchased online 
(𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑡), using different lengths of time periods. The horizontal axis shows the estimated coefficients. As 
established in our main results, the positive coefficients of single-brand store entry show the dominance of 
showrooming effect while multi-brand store entry generates overall competing effect with negative 
coefficients. The showrooming effect of single-brand store entry is significantly escalated within the first 
several weeks with a notable positive hump that peaks at four weeks after entry, and then tapers down 
afterwards. In contrast, the changes in the competing effect from multi-brand store entry over time are more 
subtle.  
 The reason behind the different time trends for showrooming and competing effects lies in the 
frequency of consumers’ offline store visits after the initial opening. In the case of showrooming, consumers 
visit a newly opened store but do not purchase due to the lack of product match or the price factor. These 
consumers are less likely to revisit the store. The increased demand as a result of the opening effect is 
transient, as showrooming cannot be sustained by sharply declining store visits. In contrast, with competing 
effect, consumers successfully find their preferred products at the store and make a purchase offline. These 
consumers are more likely to revisit the stores subsequently. Thus, the competing effect does not rely on 
the opening impact of an offline store. Therefore, compared to single-brand stores, multi-brand store entry 
generates a competing effect that is more stable than the showrooming effect. 
 
Figure 4. Store Entry Effects over Time 
  
5.6 Showrooming and Competing Effects and Location Characteristics 
In this section, we discuss several additional results that improve our understanding of the entry effects of 
the offline stores. Table 9 presents the results on how location characteristics (i.e., income, Internet use, 
and the total number of footwear stores in each location) moderate the effects of store entry.  
 Column (1) shows that the average (log transformed) income of a location can sharpen the positive 
effect of store entry on online purchases in both types of shoe stores. That is, the higher the income, the 
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stronger the showrooming effect, or the weaker the competing effect. One possible explanation is that 
consumers with higher income are relatively easily persuaded to buy because they can afford to make 
additional or impulse purchases. Another feasible explanation is that they are more likely to be 
showroomers because they are expected to have higher education levels and more knowledge about 
searching and comparing products online and offline.  
 Column (2) shows that Internet use does not affect the impact of multi-brand store entry but does 
enhance the positive effect of single-brand store entry. Showrooming is directly facilitated by Internet 
access, as consumers must be online to make purchases. It is then expected that wider Internet access is 
associated with stronger showrooming effect. However, competing effect moves consumers offline, and 
Internet access does not affect this directly. As such, Internet use affects only showrooming but not 
competing.   
 The result for the number of footwear stores is shown in column (3). This incorporates all footwear 
stores categorized under shoe retail, including those not considered for store entry. We find that with more 
stores, the competing effect of multi-brand store entry diminishes, but the showrooming effect of single-
brand store entry does not change significantly. This can be explained by consumers’ inclination towards 
online shopping under the accessibility condition of offline stores in a location. Given that the online retailer 
has no price advantage in our research context, for locations with numerous offline stores, the consumers 
who purchase online are likely to truly prefer online shopping to the offline options. Thus, the number of 
offline stores does not have a significant effect on the overall showrooming effect from single-brand store 
entry. But, if a location has limited offline options, the online consumers are more likely to be forced to 
purchase online. Multi-brand store entries in these locations would attract such consumers and produce 
more pronounced competing effect. 
 
Table 9. Store Entry Effects by Location Characteristics 
Dependent variable: 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑡 
(1) (2) (3) 
Log(Income) Internet Use Pre-Existing Stores 
𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 -29.720*** 
 
0.834* 1.426*** 
 (4.149) (0.360) (0.222) 
𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡  -17.274*** 
 
-1.411*** -1.566*** 
 (2.906) (0.234) (0.146) 
𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖  2.848*** 
 
  
 (0.376)   
𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 
 
1.463*** 
 
  
(0.269)   
𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑖   0.314**  
  (0.099)  
𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑖 
 
 0.042  
  (0.071)  
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𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑒𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖    0.000478 
   (0.000244) 
𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑒𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖    0.000979* 
 
 
  (0.000477) 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES 
Location fixed effects YES YES YES 
Observations 210,140 210,784 210,784 
R-squared 0.201 0.200 0.200 
Standard errors are clustered by location and presented in parentheses. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 
5.7 Robustness Check 
Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that the store openings are exogenous with respect to 
online demand. In the following, we discuss potential identification concerns, describe how our matching 
and DID specification help to address them, and conduct additional robustness checks. 
 Although the results are consistent with our general predictions, alternative explanations for our 
findings need to be addressed. A potential concern is that the type of opening stores reflects the store chains’ 
different location strategies to target different consumers. Single-brand stores sell products at regular price, 
similar to the online retailer, whereas multi-brand stores sell at a more discounted price, unlike the online 
retailer. Therefore, it is possible that single-brand stores may choose to locate at the areas with increasing 
demand for the online retailer, while multi-brand stores may choose to locate at the areas with decreasing 
demand for the online retailer. If that is the case, our results would be driven by reverse causation. To rule 
out this concern, we estimate DID specification (2) on only the locations that experienced both types of 
store entries in our study period. The results presented in column (1) of Table 10 are consistent with those 
we obtained in our main results. 
 A related concern is that changes in local economic conditions may be driving both the store 
openings and changes in online demand. First of all, this concern is minimized using a propensity score 
matching approach. By construction, treated and matched control locations exhibit virtually identical local 
economic conditions.  Second, although a booming economy may explain single-brand store openings and 
increasing online demand, the opposite—a declining economy-- would not be a plausible explanation for 
multi-brand store openings and decreasing online demand. Third, we consider the control locations, the 
treated locations with single-brand store openings, and the treated locations with multi-brand store openings 
to be three different groups and include group by time fixed effects in the regression. This fixed effects 
account for any group trend that may confound our results. The results in column (2) mirror our main results 
and addresses this concern. 
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 Another potential issue is that treated and control locations may differ in unobservable 
characteristics that may affect both store openings and online demand. Nevertheless, this concern is unlikely 
to explain our results. Because of the staggered introduction of the store openings, the eventually treated 
locations are first in the control group, and only later in the treatment group after the store opened. 
Accordingly, given that 501 locations experienced both single-brand and multi-brand store entries, we re-
estimate our DID specification using only the eventually treated locations. In this case, the control group 
consists exclusively of locations that are eventually treated. We find that our results remain robust (column 
(3)). 
We also test several alternative specifications, including different distance measures, different ways 
of treating missing observations, and using lags on store entries. Our qualitative results remain the same 
throughout these tests (Table 10). First, we change the radius of the influence area of a store entry from 30 
miles to 15 miles, and the results are shown in column (4). Second, considering that sales volume is count 
outcome and has many zero observations, we use Negative Binomial Model with fixed effects, instead of 
the regular fixed effects model used for our main results, and test it with maximum likelihood estimation 
(column (5)). In addition, we show that our results do not solely reflect short-run changes to consumer 
behavior after store entry; even when using a sixteen-week lag on store entry, our qualitative results remain 
the same (column (6)). Last but not the least, Bertrand et al. (2004) show that applying DID estimation to 
time series data of many periods may result in inconsistent standard errors even after clustering, and suggest 
that collapsing the time series into a “pre” and “post” period can effectively deal with this issue. Column 
(7) presents the results following their suggested technique.7 
Table 10. The Robustness of Store Entry Effects 
 
Dependent variable: 
𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑡 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Locations 
with both 
entries 
Different 
time trends 
Treatment 
locations only 
15 miles 
Negative 
Binomial 
model 
Sixteen-
week lag 
Ignoring 
time series 
𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 1.143** 
 
4.080*** 1.849*** 1.789*** 0.034*** 2.404*** 0.753*** 
(0.514) (0.192) (0.192) (0.344) (0.005) (0.331) (0.067) 
𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 
-3.539*** -2.195*** -1.446*** -1.229*** -0.033*** -1.773*** -0.264*** 
(0.428) (0.162) 0.163 (0.190) (0.005) (0.206) (0.059) 
Time fixed effects Y N Y Y Y Y / 
Location fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y / 
Group-specific time 
fixed effects 
N Y / N N N / 
                                                     
7 As store entries occurred at different time periods for different treatment locations, following Bertrand et al. (2004), we first 
regress 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑡 on location fixed effects and time specific effects, and then divide the residuals of the treatment locations only into 
two groups: residuals from weeks before store entry, and residuals from weeks after store entry. The estimates of store entry effects 
are then obtained from an OLS regression in this two-period panel.  
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Observations 13,860 210,784 105,392 140,504 172,564 90,336 11,292 
Standard errors are clustered by location and presented in parentheses. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we empirically examine the cross-retailer effect in the footwear industry where physical 
examination of the product plays an important role in consumers’ purchase decisions (Peck and Wiggins 
2006). More specifically, we consider how the cross-retailer effect diverges depending on the breadth of 
shoe brands sold at an offline retailer and illuminate factors responsible for the diverging impacts –
showrooming versus competing effects. Using the data on store openings and online transactions, we show 
the existence of both showrooming and competing effects and the contingency of the dominant effect on 
the offline store type. The traditional wisdom of competing effect holds true in our context, but only when 
an offline store is price-competitive along with broad product assortment. But when a new offline store 
does not sufficiently meet the consumers’ needs due to the lack of product diversity and price advantage, it 
can be beneficial to an online retailer by serving as a showroom. 
 Our results contribute to the understanding of store entry effect in a product category where the 
physical product examination is important for consumer purchase, contrasting the categories in previous 
studies (e.g., book, electronics and insurance). The estimated impacts, 26% for single-brand store entry and 
-19% for multi-brand store entry on online demand, provide valuable practical guidelines. These findings 
also contrast with those in the previous studies. For example, Forman et al. (2009) suggest that the breadth 
of the product line at an offline book store does not consistently affect online purchase behavior. Our results, 
however, show that the level of product assortment (single-brand or multi-brand) at an offline shoe store 
determines the direction of its entry impact on online demand. We believe that the contrast of their and our 
results are attributed to the difference in the nature of the target categories; that is, compared to books, shoes 
possess much more attributes, such as fit and comfort, that cannot be easily presented or evaluated digitally.  
Utilizing a natural experiment on distinctive shoe brands shown and provided at offline stores, we 
shed light on mechanisms through which offline store entry increases online demand. We first confirm the 
online demand increase as a result of product uncertainty reduction (within-brand showrooming). Our 
results also show that the online purchases of product brands that are not at offline stores increase, 
empirically supporting online demand induced from the provision of offline places for 
experience/information seekers price (Quint et al. 2013). These consumers seek to physically experience 
products without specific target products in mind, and the offline experiences eventually lead to online 
purchases of other brands (cross-brand showrooming). Additionally, within-brand showrooming is more 
pronounced than the cross-brand showrooming. These results highlight the potential attribution issue across 
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online and offline retailers for brand manufacturers. That is, simply observing the channel of purchases 
may present an inaccurate evaluation of the contribution of both online and off channels. 
 This research makes several practical contributions to the cross-retailer framework. Our contingent 
results of dominant cross-retailer effects offer managerial implications for both online and offline retailers. 
First, our collective findings could be the basis for new store location selection. When an offline retailer 
chooses location for a new store, it should consider cross-channel competition against online retailers as 
well as local competition with other offline stores. When a new store enters the location with few offline 
stores in order to (1) avoid the competition with offline stores and (2) effectively capture the online demand, 
based on our finding, consumers further away from pre-existing stores are likely to prefer a new store to an 
online retailer. In other words, consumers’ accessibility to shoe stores prior to the new opening can mediate 
the impact of the new store opening on the sales of the online retailer.  
 Second, our results advance our understanding of the factors that strengthen/weaken showrooming 
and competing effects. Showrooming effect does not increase along with the number of offline stores but a 
new store can always take away online demand even in the locations with many offline stores. Average 
income of individual location significantly strengthens the showrooming effect of single-brand store entry 
(and weakens the competing effects of multi-brand store entry). Wider Internet usage strengthens the 
showrooming effect of single-brand store entry because it can facilitate online purchase – it can help 
consumers to switch from offline to online purchase. However, Internet usage does not affect a consumer’s 
preference for offline purchase because Internet does not facilitate offline purchase. In sum, store managers 
can take into account the moderators identified in this study to optimize the location for a new store. 
Third and finally, our results suggest that online retailers need to localize product recommendation 
and promotion beyond showing a wide variety of products to compete more effectively against offline 
stores. Substantial heterogeneity in footwear demand across locations has been documented (Quan and 
Williams 2014). They show that Macy’s and Payless Shoe Source have been responding to cross-market 
heterogeneity, as product assortments vary significantly across stores. Waldfogel (2010) shows that an 
online retailer cannot benefit from wider product assortment. That is, if an online retailer does not take into 
account the differences in demand across locations and offline retailers customize their assortments to cater 
to local demand, it might not achieve the increase of revenue from niche/long tail (Anderson 2004, 
Brynjolfsson et al. 2003). As a result, online retailers have to customize product assortment and plan 
location-specific marketing activities. 
This study examines the role of product assortment and price in consumers’ online and offline 
channel choices, respectively. Our analyses on their interactions are limited by the aggregate level of data. 
Each observation in our data consists of transactions at a competing online retailer in a particular location-
week. Thus, we cannot say with certainty which transactions belong to the exact same consumer. When 
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transaction data at the individual consumer level is available, further research is needed to establish how 
price competitiveness and the level of product assortment at a store interact with each other. 
Our operationalization of product assortment with the number of shoe brands was designed to 
quantify the impact of product assortment on consumers’ channel choice. We verify that offline store entry 
can increase the online purchases of the store brand as well as those of other brands. Then, we use the 
footwear brand carried by a single-brand store that opens in an area as the proxy for an increase in physical 
examination of that product brand in that area. Limited by our data, however, we cannot observe whether 
the products consumers purchased online are exactly the same products they examined offline rather than 
different products under the same brand. This is a limitation in our identification. It does not change the 
main implications for shoe manufacturers and brand management. Given the dearth of research that 
carefully models the mechanism of showrooming, more precise quantification will be a promising avenue 
for future research. 
Although our results contribute to an understanding of store entry effect in a product category where 
physical examination of the product is important for consumer purchase, it is inherently limited to a selected 
product category of footwear. It would be worthwhile to pursue future research on more diverse product 
categories purchased online after offline store entry. It may help to validate the generalizability of our 
results to other product categories (e.g., apparel) that share the similar characteristics. The variation of 
complementarity and substitutability across categories as a result of offline store entry would also be a 
possible direction. Furthermore, the change of product categories purchased online after the entry of stores 
carrying diverse product categories seems worthy of future research. 
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